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Abstract 
 
In this paper we explore the effect of protection lobbying by solving a firm’s dynamic 
optimisation problem where there is uncertainty about future demand, the success of lobbying 
and non-zero entry/exit costs.  We find out that the firms in declining industries tend to 
lobbying in economic downturn to prevent shutting down factories.  On the contrary, the 
firms in growing industries tend to lobby for preventing other firms from entering the market.  
The degree of this effect depends on the ratio of exit costs to entry costs. It is shown that the 
higher the ratio, the stronger the effect is.  
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I.  Introduction 
The literature on political economy and trade has offered several explanations for the 
persistence of protection in terms of the interaction between declining industry, lobby, 
protection and self-interested politicians.  Much of the earlier literature modelled the 
lobbying activities in a “political market” and small open economy, in which the 
domestic producers in import-competing industries would invest resources in 
lobbying for the protection until the marginal return on the last unit of contribution 
was equal to its probable return producing the transfer (see Tullock, 1967; Kemp, 
1976; Bhagwati, 1980).  The classical analysis of political and economic activities has 
focused on the rent- or revenue-seeking activities and their associated costs of 
distortions (see Krueger, 1974; Brock and Magee, 1978; Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 
1980; Bhagwati, 1980).  
A variety of models have been developed to extend research on the 
determination of domestic and international policies.  One line of research has 
focused on domestic regulatory policy and trade policy formation.  For example, 
Hillman (1982) adopts the Stigler-Peltzman assumption and uses a Ricardo-Viner 
framework in which government maximizes a political-support function by balancing 
the changes of the welfare of two competiting interest groups.  Political support thus 
depends on the regulated domestic price level (see Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976).1  
A second line of research has emphasized the endogenous determination of 
trade policies through a political process.  If voters in democratic societies are fully 
informed, the determination of trade policy would depend on the interests of the 
median voter (see Mayer, 1984).  On the other hand, in a representative democracy 
                                                          
1 See Hillman (1989) for a comprehensive survey of this approach. See also Long and Vousden 
(1991), and Choi (2001).  
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framework, interest groups can probably enforce the lobbying pressure on bureaucrats 
or legislators to influence economic policies in favour of themselves.2   The approach 
recently developed in Grossman and Helpman (1994) combines elements of these two 
lines, in which profit-maximizing lobby groups make political contributions to 
influence government policies, while the self-interested politicians maximize the 
objective function that is linear in social welfare and total contributions collected.  
The endogenous nature of trade policies is abundantly analyzed in a large 
number of contributions in previous literature.  When attention is turned to determine 
the path of industry adjustment and lobbying over a long period, in earlier literature 
the industry and politicians are assumed to engage in the political activities of a 
simplified repeated timing structure.  From the standpoint of a single firm or an 
import-competing industry within a country, the benefits of protection can be 
significant and hence firms will have strong incentives to invest effort and money into 
the political process to secure benefits or defer collapses.3   Under this framework, 
there exists no uncertainty throughout the whole political process, i.e. the more the 
interest groups contribute, the more protection they can obtain.4  
Clearly, the self-interest assumption looks much less adequate in 
contemporary interational political economy where trade policies are presumably 
determined by complex interactions between the counterpart interest groups and 
politicians within domestic politics.  In this paper, we will therefore adopt a quite 
                                                          
2 Hillman (1989) and Riezman and Wilson (1995) review the literature. See also Brock and Magee 
(1978), Findlay and Wellisz (1982), Rodrik (1986), Young and Magee (1986), and Magee et al. (1989) 
for the political economy models.  
3 Hillman (1982), Cassing and Hillman (1986), and Choi (2001) adopt the political-support function 
to analyze the protectionist responses to declining industries. Using the Grossman-Helpman framework, 
Brainard and Verdier (1994, 1997) investigate the industry’s optimal adjustment path under lobbying. 
Brainard and Verdier (1997) is also concerned with the political process for growing industries.  
4 Exceptions to this include Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1980), Moore and Suranovic (1992), whose 
models are consistent with the political model. 
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plausible assumption that domestic industry of the import-competing good is 
uncertain about the tendency of future prices and tariffs, and therefore its revenues.5  
The uncertainty of firm’s revenues is introduced in Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2002) 
by considering that a firm has two different values when it is facing high vs low 
demand.  By using that, they demonstrate that the only-losers-lobby equilibrium is a 
Markov perfect equilibrium and also a dominant strategy.  We will re-examine firm’s 
decision to lobby or not with a lobbying model of the real options type.  By doing so, 
we then are allowed to consider the impact of uncertainty and real options on the 
decision of industry lobbying.  
Real option theory considers the benefit to a firm of delaying irreversible 
investment decisions when facing an uncertain economic future (see Dixit and 
Pindyck 1994 for a comprehensive analysis of real option theory).  In widely cited 
paper, McDonald and Siegel (1986) use real option theory to show that the required 
rate of return on investment in many large industries can be more than doubled by 
moderate amounts of uncertainty when the investment is at least, in part, irreversible. 
Pindyck and Solimano (1993) examine the empirical relationship between uncertainty 
and investment.  They use measures of economic and political instability to proxy for 
uncertainty about the marginal profitability of capital and inflation to proxy economic 
uncertainty.  They find that inflation is invers  ely correlated with investment.  
The use of real option theory to analyze investment under uncertainty has 
become increasingly popular (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1998; Coy, 1999).  The real 
option approach argues that firms may benefit from waiting for more information 
                                                          
5  Recently viewing agents’ interactions in game theoretical terms has also proved helpful in 
understanding certain features of international political economy (See Bagwell and Staiger, 1997; Levy, 
1999).  
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concerning the economic environment before making investment decisions.  This 
benefit (or real option) is lost once the decision is made.  Consequently, the firm 
requires the NPV to be considerably greater than zero to compensate for the lost 
benefit before deciding to invest.   
Real option theory is relevant to any investment decision where adjustment 
costs are irreversible and there is uncertainty.  For examples, firms may exercise real 
options in relation to changing production, taking over a rival, diversifying markets, 
closing factories (see McDonald and Siegel, 1986), hiring new employees, and firing 
employees (see Bentolila and Bertola, 1990; Chen and Zoega, 1999; Booth et al, 
2002). 
Our analysis shows the relationship between protection lobbying and industry 
decision can be explained within the approach of real options. Furthermore, we show 
that in an uncertain environment combined with high ratio of exit costs to entry costs, 
firms in declining industry lobby for protection in economic downturns and firms in 
growing industry lobby for preventing poential entry from other firms in strong 
demand. The high ratio of exit costs to entry costs implies that entry options play 
crucial role in firms’ decisions of lobbying, entry, and exit in facing an uncertain 
demand.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section II develops a 
theoretical model which describes how demand uncertainty might influence firm’s 
entry and exit decisions and protection lobbying. Section III discusses the calibration 
results. Finally, section IV exlpores on some of the policy implications of our findings 
and suggests avenues for future research. 
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II.  The Theory of the Firm 
For simplicity, the production function of the representative firm is denoted by a 
Cobb-Douglas production function 
ααθ −= 1KNY , 0<α<1,                                              (1) 
where N is the number of employees engaged in production, K capital stock, and θ he 
efficiency parameter.  The capital stock K is taken as given at any point in time and 
normalised to one, which gives the following strict concavity of the production 
function.  
αθNY = ,                                                       (2) 
It is assumed that the firm is in an import-competing industry of imperfect 
competition.  The firm faces an isoelastic demand function where p and Y denote the 
price and the output, respectively (See Abel and Eberly, 1994). 
( ) ZYp ψψ−= 1 ,  ψ ≥ 1,                                            (3) 
where Z represented the source of the demand shock, by stochastic process and/or 
jump processes by protection lobbying, ψ is an elasticity parameter with minimum 
value of 1 under perfect competition.  If the firm is lobbying, then the current profits 
become 
cHwNZN −−−=Π γθ ψαψ1 ,                                           (4) 
where w and γ denote the wages for employees and lobbyists hired by the firm 
respectively, c represents fixed cost of employment and physical capital to spread 
these costs over adjustment, and H is the total number of the lobbyists.  Note that the 
wage for the lobbyists, γ is higher than employees’ wages, w, and H is assumed less 
than N.  The lobbyists are assumed not to participate in production, but to be related to 
the possible jump in demand by lobbying for protection. 
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The risk-neutral firm has two-stage optimal choices. First it chooses 
employment to maximise its expected discounted value of profits. After optimisation 
of employment, the employment level becomes a function of demand.  In the second 
stage, the firm considers its entry/exit problem according to the fluctuations of 
demand.  The firm’s expected discounted value of profits is: 
[ ]∫
∞
−
−−−=
0
1    max dsecHwNZNV rs
N
γθ ψαψ ,                               (5) 
where r is the required rate of return for the industry.   
Under increasing globalization and a rise around the world of steps toward 
special regional trading agreements, fluctuations of demand faced by the firm 
realistically come from two sources of uncertainty: the economic and non-economic 
activities.  One on hand, real world investment and profit of the firm can be sensitive 
to volatility and uncertainty over the economic environment.  One the other hand, 
under the World Trade Organization (WTO) auspices, it is anticipated that                             
the WTO contracting parties would undertake a series of negotiating rounds in which 
each country would make concessions to its trading partners in order to gain 
something in the trading system. Thus, the non-economic activities such as the 
political decisions of lobbying to influence industry and trade policy outcomes 
undoubtedly contribute to the uncertainty of firm’s revenue. To consider this, we 
assume that firm’s demand follows a combined geometric Brownian motion and jump 
processes as follows: 
21 dqdqZdZdtdZ −++= ϖση ,                                   (6) 
where ϖ  is a Wiener process; dtd εϖ =  (since ε is a normally distributed random 
variable with mean zero and a standard deviation of unity), η is the drift parameter, σ 
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the variance parameter, dq1 and dq2 are the increments of Poisson processes (with 
mean arrival rates λ1 and λ2).  It is assumed that if an “event 1” (or “event 2”) occurs, 
Z increases (or falls) by φ1 (or φ2) percents with probability 1.  Over each time interval 
dt, there is a probability λ1dt (or λ2dt) that it will rise up (or drop down) by φ1Z (or 
φ2Z) and Z fluctuates until next event occurs.  In this model, if the firm succeeds in 
expending resources to influence government policy in its favour, the demand for its 
goods is supposed to rise up, i.e. event 1.  The occurring jump by political lobbying 
would be partially offset by drops in the demand, i.e. event 2. We assume that the 
probability of jump is higher than the one of drop.  Note that it is assumed that (dq1, 
dq2) and dϖ  are independent to each other.  Thus, ( ) 01 =dqdE ϖ , ( ) 02 =dqdE ϖ , and 
E(dq1dq2) = 0.  
By using Itô’s Lemma, the Bellman equation for the case of lobbying for the 
value V at time zero in the continuation region is: 
 
( )( ){ } ( )( ){ }ZVVVZV
VZσηZVcHwN ZNrV ZZZ
2211
221
11                                             
2
1
φλφλ
γθ ψαψ
−−−−++
++−−−=
.       (7) 
The first term on the right-hand side is revenue, wN  is the total wage bill, and γH  is 
the total wage bill for the lobbyists. ηZVZ  is the gain due to demand growth, 
ZZVZ
22
2
1
σ  denotes the changes caused by stochastic changes in demand, and the last 
two terms are the change in the value of the firm caused by changes in lobbying. The 
firm always optimises its labour employment level to maximise the discounted profit 
before making its entry and exit decision. The first-order conditions for L gives6: 
                                                          
6 Here we assume that there are no sunk costs for hiring and firing.  For the impact of irreversible 
labour-related sunk cost investment, see Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and Booth et al (2002). 
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wZN =−1
1
ψα
ψ
ψ
αθ .                                                 (8) 
When the demand is changed by its trend growth, wiener process, and/or lobbying, 
the firm chooses its optimal employment level N*, determined by equation (8).  
Rearranging the terms gives the optimal employment level N*, given the demand level: 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=
ψ
α
ψ
ψ
αθ 111* Z
w
N .                                             (9) 
Plugging the variable N* into Equation (7) then gives: 
( )( ){ } ( )( ){ }ZVVVZV
VZZVcHwNNZrV ZZZ
2211
22**1
11                                    
2
1- )(
φλφλ
σηγθ ψαψ
−−−−++
++−−=
.            (10) 
To find the impact of protection lobbying on the entry/exit of the firms we 
need to find out the optimal condition after the optimisation of employment. Since the 
decisions for entry/exit involve sunk-cost investment, the firm needs to compare the 
marginal costs and benefits of entry and exit.  The solutions for ( )ZV  of equation (10) 
consist of the particular solution and complementary solution.  We first deal with 
identification of uncertainty effects in the very special case where there exist no sunk 
costs for entry and exit.  This special case turns out to be useful as a starting point and 
for comparisons.  Then we turn to the general case with sunk costs of entry and exit.  
  The particular solutions of equation (10) can be written as the following 
integral: 
( ) [ ] ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−−−= ∫∞ −
0
**1 )( dsecHwNNZEZV rsP γθ ψαψ .                     (11) 
We then have the following particular integral: 
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( )
r
c
r
H
r
wN
r
NZZV P −−−
+−−
=
γ
φλφλη
θ ψαψ *
2211
*1 )(
.                        (12) 
The firm’s option values of entry and exit in the future are represented and measured 
by the complementary function:  
( )( ){ } ( )( ){ }221122 112
1 φλφλση −−−−+++= ZVVVZVVZZVrV ZZZ .   (13) 
Letting vG  be the value of the option, the general solutions have the following forms7 
[See the Appendix A]:  
( ) 11 βZAZV GI = ,                                                  (14) 
( ) 22 βZAZV GE = ,                                                  (15) 
where β1 and β2 are the positive roots of the following characteristic equation: 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ] 011111
2
1
2211
2
=−−−−−+++− rββ φλφληβββσ .        (16) 
Following the standard approach of real options (e.g., see Dixit and Pindyck; 
1994), the value-matching conditions for the entry and exit demand thresholds 
[ ]EI ZZ  and  are denoted by  
12
12
*
2211
*1 )( ββ
ψαψ γ
φλφλη
θ
II
II ZAIZA
r
c
r
H
r
wN
r
NZ
+=+−−−
+−−
,                (17) 
21
21
*
2211
*1 )( ββ
ψαψ γ
φλφλη
θ
EE
EE ZAEZA
r
c
r
H
r
wN
r
NZ
+=+⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
−−−
+−−
− ,                (18) 
where EI NN  and  are optimal values for N computed via equation (9) for  the entry 
and exit demand thresholds EI ZZ  and . When the representative firm decides to set 
                                                          
7  Since there are no sunk costs for the adjustment of employment level, the firm adjust the 
employment continuously until Z fluctuates to hit either investment or dis-investment thresholds. This 
implies that the firm faces a two-stage decision-making problem and thus takes the first-stage optimal 
value of N as given when making the entry/exit decisions. This indicates that the general solutions only 
contain the component of Z, not N. 
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up a new factory, it gains VP and the option to discontinue its operations in the future, 
G
EV , while pays the entry costs I and sacrifices an option to enter later, 
G
IV .   When, 
during an economic downturn, the firm then decides to close down its operations and 
shut down the factory, it gains −VP (since VP is then a negative number) and an option 
to re-enter GIV , while pays the exit costs E, and sacrifices an option to go out of 
business later, GEV .  Finally, the smooth-pasting conditions follow: 
1
11
1
22
2211
*1
12
)(
−−
=+
+−−
ββ
ψαψ
ββφλφλη
θ
II ZAZAr
N ,                        (19) 
1
22
1
11
2211
*1
21
)(
−−
=+
+−−
−
ββ
ψαψ
ββφλφλη
θ
EE ZAZAr
N .                        (20) 
Equations (17), (18), (19) and (20) form a non-linear system of equations with four 
unknown parameters, 21  and  ,, AAZZ EI , and can be solved for numerically once the 
solutions for β1 and β2 are obtained from (16) and the optimal values for EI NN  and  
via equation (9). 
Note that the entry and exit policy of the optimising firm is discontinuous. In 
some periods the optimal strategy of the firm will be determined to adjust the number 
of employees. Under other demand fluctuation conditions, the firm will enter or exit 
from the market.  More specifically, the inaction will always be chosen when 
deviations of the expected marginal product of the firm from the optimal level do not 
justify the costs of entry/exit adjustment.  In such situations, the firm prefers to adjust 
the actual level of employment.  Notice that adjustments to entry/exit will only be 
observed when deviations in the expected marginal revenue product of labour from 
the optimal level are large enough to compensate for the entry and exit costs and net 
value of relevant options.  In other words, entry and exit costs generate a corridor of 
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inaction.  This region is identified by the upper, ZI, and lower, ZE, control barriers. In 
next section, we discuss the results of numerical simulations.  
 
III.  Numerical Simulations 
Most of the structure of the simulated model was shown and explained in the previous 
section.  To have a feel on the quantitative importance of the various factors discussed 
above, we present some numerical examples.  Unless otherwise noted, in what 
follows we keep some of the numerical values of the parameters fixed throughout the 
calculations, and others will be varied over a range to examine the comparative effects.  
The fixed parameters include the wages for employees and lobbyists hired by the firm, 
w = 1.0, γ = 1.2 w; when the total number of professional lobbyists is relatively less 
than that of workers the quantities are fixed at H = 0.02. 8   Parameters of the 
production function are also fixed, the constant θ = 2.0 and the exponent α = 0.5; 
while the adjustment cost is fixed at c = 0.5.  The discount factor which reflects the 
required rate of return for the firm is set to be r = 0.15.  The price elasticity of 
demand parameter is set at Ψ = 1.5 as in Bovenberg et al. (1998).  Without loss of 
generality, the parameters denoting for the tendency of demand growth are initially 
fixed at η = 0 and σ = 0.12.  Finally, throughout the exercise the unit time length 
corresponds to one year.  
Turning to the parameters that are the focus of our study, we consider first two 
events in the rules for the firm pursuing protection lobbying (See the descriptions 
following equation 6).  To match the figures of real worlds, we assume that λ1 is 
greater than λ2, i.e. the probability of the demand for the firm’s goods to rise up is 
greater than that to drop down.  The parameters are fixed at λ1dt = 0.3 dt and λ2 dt = 
                                                          
8  Note that the optimal value of N is roughly equal to 1.0 if there are no sunk costs for entry and exit. 
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0.15 dt, while the amounts of demand changes in the two events are fixed at φ1 = 0.1 
and φ2 = 0.1.  In the last part of the simulations, we will plot the 3-D graphs in which 
both φ1 and φ2 are allowed to change over the range [0, 0.1] to enrich our analysis.  
Figure 1 presents results of the impact of demand growth on the entry and exit 
thresholds with/without lobbying for the case where the entry cost is relatively lower 
than the exit cost, e.g. I = 0.1 and E = 1.0.9  With a fixed cost of adjustment, as 
illustrated in Figure 1, in the presence of option effect, higher growth in demand 
growth rate will lead to lower thresholds for entry, which implies that firms wait less 
to enter the market.  The figure also shows that lobbying would lead to lower 
thresholds for entry in economic downturn, i.e. the senescent industry chooses to 
lobby for protection to keep on in business and avoid closure of factory.  It makes 
sense and is supported by most of the earlier literature. 
  
Figure 1: The Impact of Demand Growth on the Entry and Exit Thresholds 
for I = 0.1 and E = 1.0.  
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However, as shown in Figure 1 lobbying would lead to higher thresholds for 
entry and exit in booms.  That is, for high-growth industries, firms would choose not 
to lobby for preventing closure of factories. If the firm does choose to lobby, it is for 
η 
 13
higher exit thresholds for preventing entry from other firms. One of what the results 
show is probably due to the difficulty for incumbent firms to conquer the problem that 
rents in expanding industries attract entrants who will preferably perform as free 
riders, even for a very short period.  The result above echoes the findings by Brainard 
and Verdier (1997).  However, the reason for this is quite different.  The important 
point stressed in the model is that for the declining industry if firms choose to lobby, 
then in economic downturn the entry options in exit thresholds would be higher due to 
higher demand level.  Therefore, firms would wait longer to shut down factory since 
the benefit of shutting down is higher. For the growing industry, the entry options are 
more important in entry thresholds than in the exit thresholds.  Therefore, the 
lobbying has greater effect in preventing other firms from entering the market, not in 
preventing from shutting down the factory.  
The analysis above is most due to the entry option in exit decision.  The effect 
of changes in the entry cost is shown in Figures 2 and 3.  As can be seen from theses 
figures, as the entry cost increase from 0.1 to 1.0 and 10.0, the entry thresholds 
denoting for lobbying option become significantly steeper, i.e. the value of the option 
to lobby is getting higher with higher demand growth.  In contrast, the crossover in 
the exit threshold lines almost disappears – it is almost optimal to lobby for 
preventing shutting down the factory even for high growth industry.  The reason is 
that the entry option in exit decision is getting smaller due to high entry costs/entry 
thresholds and the effect is smaller.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
9 Note that in the case of no-lobbying, the values of λ1 and λ2 are set to zero. 
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Figure 2: The Impact of Demand Growth on the Entry and Exit Thresholds 
for I = 1.0 and E = 1.0.  
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Figure 3: The Impact of Demand Growth on the Entry and Exit Thresholds 
for I = 10.0 and E = 1.0. 
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To get a better idea of factors that affect the value of the lobbying option, we 
next consider the effect of the volatility of the combined geometric Brownian motion 
representing demand uncertainty, i.e. the variance of firm’s demand growth on the 
option (See the second term in the right hand side of equation (6)).  As an illustration, 
Figure 4 shows the case in which 05.0−=η  and all other things are set equal except 
that σ  is allowed to change throughout the simulation.  Observe that the entry 
η 
η 
 15
thresholds indicating the lobbying and no lobbying cases increase when σ  increases.  
Leaving aside the possibility of protective lobbying by firms in the senescent industry, 
as in the existing literature, here we find that the threshold value where investment 
takes place increases in the variance of firm’s demand growth.  That is, greater 
uncertainty increases the value of a firm’s entry option, but for the same reason that 
reduces the firm’s incentives to take action actually.  As a result, in volatile economic 
and political environment, the best policy is to keep options open and await new 
information rather than commit an investment immediately. Figure 4 also 
demonstrates that lobbying would lead to lower thresholds for entry in economic 
downturn.  Thus, the senescent industry always chooses to lobby for protection to stay 
away from closure of factory.  Note as well that the difference between the entry 
thresholds of lobbying and no lobbying increases in σ , which implies the firm in the 
declining industry has more incentives of lobbying when the market or economic 
environment becomes more uncertain.   
The dependence of the exit thresholds on the variance of firm’s demand 
growth is also shown in the right hand side of Figure 4.  Observe that the exit 
thresholds indicating the lobbying and no lobbying cases decrease when σ  increases. 
Also, note that the difference between the exit thresholds of lobbying and no lobbying 
cases decreases in σ .  Thus, for given large values of σ , the zone of lobbying 
thresholds shrinks considerably in contrast that of no lobbying thresholds.  As one 
would expect, the uncertainty of demand growth has a greater effect on the firm’s 
investment decision, and for the very reason that induces the firm’s incentives to 
lobby.  That is, by doing that, the declining industry under a highly unpredictable 
economic and political environment is able to capture some certain information to 
enjoy profits from protection at the expense of lobbying commitments to politicians.  
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Figure 4: The Impact of the Variance of Demand Growth on the Entry 
and Exit Thresholds for I = 0.1, E = 1.0 and 05.0−=η .  
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Thus far, the analysis mainly discusses the effects of demand growth rate on 
the simulations.  Recall that we allow for the possibility that the demand for the firm’s 
goods to take a Poisson jump upward is greater than that to take a jump downward 
once the firm successfully shapes government policy in its favour.  The jump process 
is anticipated, however its arrival date is assumed stochastic.  To gain more insight 
into the effects of protection lobbying pursued by the declining firm on its investment 
option, let us next turn to investigate the effects of the last two terms in equation (6).   
The 3-D graphs in Figure 5 show a sensitivity analysis of the entry and exit thresholds, 
both as functions of φ1 and φ2.  These graphs clearly demonstrate the entirely possible 
lobby-action areas.  Note that φ1 = φ2 = 0.1 and φ1 = φ2 = 0 are the benchmark and no-
lobbying cases respectively, while that in between would be the impact of success and 
failure of protection lobbying.   
 
 
sigma, σ sigma, σ 
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Figure 5: The Threshold Values as Function of φ1 and φ2  
for I = 0.01, E = 1.0 and 05.0−=η .  
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As seen in the graphs, in a declining industry with 05.0−=η , any changes in 
φ1 and/or φ2 may lead to big changes in entry thresholds but not exit thresholds.  
Graphing the entry and exit thresholds against possibilities of demand jumps (φ1 and 
φ2) gives some idea of how the optimal lobbying rule develops.  First, the entry 
threshold decreases in the differential of φ1 − φ2.  (Thus, a higher φ1 drops the value of 
the entry option therefore the declining industry has every intention of pursuing 
protection lobbying.)  The impact of φ1 and φ2 on the entry thresholds is non-
monotonic and asymmetric. This is due to the fact that there are two terms that depend 
upon φ1 and φ2. The first of these is the entry option value of waiting which is 
increasing in φ1 (higher φ1 means higher uncertainty) while the second effect is 
expected profitability, which lowers the entry thresholds. Note that the effect of 
higher expected profitability dominates as φ1 increases; however effect of the 
dominance of φ1 falls with higher φ1. Similarly there are two terms depending on φ2. 
A higher φ2 leads to higher entry options (due to higher risk) and lower expected 
φ2 φ2 φ1 φ1 
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profitability. Both effects would increase the entry thresholds and firms are reluctant 
to invest. Both effects of risk and profitability would make entry less attractive. The 
higher value of φ2, the stronger effects of risk and profitability are. (On the other hand, 
an increase in φ2 increases the option value of waiting hence reduces the lobbyist’s 
intention to take action.)  Second, all other things equal as both φ1 and φ2 increases at 
the same rate, the entry threshold decreases insignificantly.  This implies that the 
declining industry has no intention to lobby since the effect is cancelled out and that 
eventually there is no effect at all, no matter what the value of the Poisson jump 
parameter.  
 
 
Figure 6: The Threshold Values as Function of φ1 and φ2  
for I = 0.01, E = 1.0 and 025.0=η . 
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To end the section, we consider the case of the lobbying option of a growing 
industry.  Intuition tells us that an incumbent firm in a growing industry may grow 
rapidly when it lobbies politicians to prevent new entrants and thus enjoy increasing 
profits.  On the contrary, as pointed by Brainard and Verdier (1997), if lobby 
formation requires the payment of some sunk cost, an incumbent firm in a growing 
  
φ1 φ1 
φ2 φ2 
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industry faces the greater risk that future rents will be driven away with entry and thus 
is possibly unwilling to lobby since it is more unlikely to overcome the free-rider 
problems.  As we can see in the graphs of Figure 6, both the critical values of the 
entry and exit options change trivially with respective to φ1 and φ2 for the case of 
025.0=η .  The graphs, which can be regarded as a supplement to Figure 1, help 
understanding the case where the firm would be indifferent to lobbying.   
 
 
IV.  Summary and Conclusions 
Previous literature has mainly analyzed government’s choice of trade policy 
by assuming that lobby formation is assumed exogenous or developing models in 
which both government policy and lobby formation are determined endogenously.  
Until recently, Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2002) model the uncertainty of firm’s 
revenues when it is facing high versus low demand, and remarkably demonstrate why 
losers “pick government policy” rather that government policy picks losers.  In this 
paper we have focused instead on the link between lobbying and political (and/or 
economic) uncertainty by employing ideas and analytical techniques developed in the 
real options literature.   
One important feature of our model is that an industry decides whether or not 
to contribute to a lobbying attempt based on individual expected discounted value of 
profits, and that the opportunity to lobby for protection is simply assigned to one firm 
only.  We have shown that an uncertain political and economic environment exerts a 
non-trivial influence on industry’s lobbying decision.  The first result is that when the 
entry cost is relatively lower than the exit cost, in the presence of option effect, 
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lobbying would lead to lower thresholds for entry in economic downturn, which 
means the senescent industry chooses to lobby for protection to avoid closure of 
factory.  In contrast, lobbying would lead to higher thresholds for entry in booms.  
That is, for high-growth industries, firms would choose not to lobby, unless they 
choose to prevent new entry into market.  
The second result is that greater uncertainty increases the value of a firm’s 
entry option, but for the same reason that reduces the firm’s incentives to take action 
actually.  For a firm in volatile economic and political environment, the best policy is 
to keep options open and await new information rather than commit an investment 
immediately.  Finally, our model shows that with either a higher φ1 or a lower φ2, the 
declining industry has every intention of pursuing protection lobbying. On the 
contrary, the firm in a growing industry is possibly unwilling to lobby.   
The model developed above is certainly stylized and thus may not capture all 
of the details.  However, the model contributes to the literature by shedding light on 
the inter-linkages between policy uncertainty, option value and the motivation of 
lobby at the firm level.  The extension is also useful for identifying the conditions 
under which firms in a declining industry are more willing to lobby than those in a 
growing industry.   
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The Appendix: 
Assume that the solution to equation (13) in the text is represented by the following 
functional form: 
βAZV = .                                                     (A1) 
This gives the following relationships 
βηβη ZAZVZ = ,                                              (A2) 
( ) βββσσ ZAVZ ZZ 12
1
2
1 222
−=                                  (A3) 
( )( ){ } ( ){ }111 11 −+=−+ ββ φλφλ AZVZV ,                         (A4) 
( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( ){ }ββ φλφλ 22 11111 −−−=−−− AZVV ,                   (A5) 
Substituting (A2), (A3), (A4), and (A5) into (13) in the text gives the characteristic 
equation (14) in the text. 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ] 011111
2
1
2211
2
=−−−−−+++− rββ φλφληβββσ .             (A6) 
Thus, we have the homogeneous solutions of (14) and (15) in the text: 
( ) 11 βZAZV GI = , 
( ) 22 βZAZV GE = , 
where 1β  and 1β  are the positive and negative roots for the characteristic equation 
respectively. 
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